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Fitting a Square Peg into a Round Hole:
The Application of Traditional Rules of Law





In the ever-changing technological environment, the transmission of
information has become as simple and as quick as the click of a mouse or the
touch of a button. However, the emergence and widespread use of computers,
electronic mail ("e-mail"), and the Internet in the workplace also has created
challenges for employers, their attorneys, and the courts. Specifically, the courts
are forced to applytraditional rules oflaw to modern technological advancements.
The lack of symmetry between these two notions has created uncertainty for
today's employer. This Article discusses the impact of new technology on
employment law, particularly in the areas of the discovery process, employer
liability for employees' electronic communications, and the attorney-client
privilege.
* Gregory I. Rasinis a senior partner at Jackson Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman and
heads the finn's litigation department nationwide.
** Joseph P. Moan was Senior Counsel atTexaco, Inc., and is currently counsel at
Jackson Lewis Schnitzler & Krupman.
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II. THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY ON THE DISCOVERY PROCESS
At its essence, the discovery process seeks to compel the opposing party in
civil litigation to produce information that could be damaging to his or her case.
Rule 34(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the scope of this
process. In 1970, Rule 34(a) was amended to provide for the discovery of "data
compilations from which information canbe obtained [or] translated if necessary,
by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable form."' The
amendment also allows for the inspection, testing, copying, or sampling of "any
tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule
26(b)."' Although the language of the 1970 amendment is somewhat cryptic, the
notes from the 1970 Advisory Committee make clear that the revision was made
"to accord with changing technology."3
Since the 1970 amendment, and in accordance with the Advisory
Committee's intention, courts consistently have held that electronic
communications and information are discoverable under Rule 34(a).4 Both
plaintiffs and defendants, alike, have been ordered to produce computerized
information, including e-mail,5 employee data information, word processing
documents,6 and, in some instances, the computer itself.7 Notwithstanding that
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a). Rule 26(b)(1), as amended in December 2000, provides:
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the
claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things ......
3. Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Utah 1985).
4. See, e.g., Sattarv. Motorola, 138 F.3d 1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998) (allowing the
discovery of 210,000 pages worth of e-mails in a religious discrimination claim); In re
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 Civ. 897 & MDL 997, 1995
WL 360526, at * 1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (enforcing an e-mail discoveryrequest);Bills,
108 F.R.D. at 461 (ordering the production "of documents containing detailed, particular
information regarding numerous employees at [the defendant's] Utah operations" in an
age discrimination case).
5. Discovery requests seeking a litigant's electronic mail ("e-mail') have become
commonplace. Attorneys consider e-mail a potentially wealthy source of discovery
because e-mail messages are often written very informally. As a result, each time an e-
mail message is sent, the computer user unwittingly may have created a potentially
discoverable document for future litigation. For a discussion of how e-mail messages,
and other technological advancements, can expose an employer to liability, see infranotes
82-157 and accompanying text.
6. See Sattar, 138 F.3d at 1171; Simon Property Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194
F.R.D. 639,641 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Easley, McCaleb & Assocs., Inc. v. Perry, No. E-2663
(Ga. Super. Ct. July 13, 1994). For example, the District Court for the District of Utah
stated:
In many instances it will be essential for the discovering party to know the
[Vol. 66
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"today it is black letter law that computerized data is discoverable if relevant,"
many issues remain.' Does the term "data compilation" include documents and
electronic communications that the computer user seemingly "deleted" yet
persistently survive on the computer's hard drive? May a litigant produce such
discovery on computer disk, or must the documents be produced in hard copy?
Finally, who bears the expenses in producing the electronic discovery?
"[B]ecause we live in a society which emphasizes both computer technology and
litigation," employers must familiarize themselves with these issues to prevent
future liability.9
A. The Manner in Which Electronic Infornation Is Produced
In 1980, Rule 34 was amended to require parties to produce documents for
inspection "as they are kept in the usual course of business or... organize and
label them to correspond with the categories in therequest.""' The dual intentions
of this requirement are to prevent a respondent from "deliberately... mix[ing]
critical documents with others in the hope of obscuring significance" ' and to
provide the requesting party with documents in usable form. 2 In the context of
electronic discovery, however, thelatter purposemaybefrustratedbecauseparties
often do not have identical computer programs that would allow them to review
responsive computerized information. Eerily anticipating this scenario, the 1970
amendments to Rule 34 provide that when producing data compilations, the
respondent may be required to translate such information through detection
underlying theory and the procedures employed in preparing and storing the
machine-readable records. When this is true, litigants should be allowed to
discover any material relating to the record holder's computer hardware, the
programming techniques employed in connection with the relevant data, the
principles governing the structure of the data, and the operation of the data
processing system.
Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 461.
7. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Metro Mark Prods. Ltd., 43 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954
(N.D. Mll. 1999); cf. Fennellv. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526,533 (lst Cir. 1996)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refising to permit the
plaintiff to access the defendant's hard drive).
8. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995); see Bills, 108 F.RID. at 461 ("It is now axiomatic
that electronically stored information is discoverable under Rule 34 .... ).
9. Bills, 108 F.R1D. at 461.
10. FED. R Civ. P. 34(b).
11. FED. R. Cir. P. 34(b) advisory committee's note.
12. See FED. R. Crv. P. 34(a).
3
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devices so as to produce the information in usable form. The Advisory
Committee to the 1970 amendments clarified the requirement by stating:
[W]hen the data can as a practical matter be made usable by the
discovering party only through respondent's devices, respondent may
be required to use his devices to translate the data into usable form. In
many instances, this means that respondent will have to supply a
printout of computer data.
[Similarly, if] the discovering party needs to check the electronic source
itself, the court may [so order]. 4
Although there is little case law addressing the 1970 and 1980 amendments in the
context of the manner in which electronic discovery must be produced, the
holdings of those courts that have discussed the issue illustrate that their approach
to electronic discovery has progressed over time. As the use of advanced
technological communication and computer document storage devices become
commonplace, it appears that the courts have become more amenable to discovery
requests seeking information in computerized form.
For example, in the 1982 case of Williams v. Owens-illinois, Inc.,"5 the
Ninth Circuit addressed a request for the production of computer tapes. 6 In
Williams, an employment discrimination case and one of the earliest opinions
addressing the manner in which responsive electronic information is to be
produced, the trial court ordered the discovery of the information contained on the
defendant's computer tapes throughhard copy wage cards.17 The court, however,
did not order the defendant to turn over physical possession of the tapes.'" In
affirming the trial court's holding, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's
argument that this manner of discovery was inadequate.1 9 The court stated:
"While using the cards may be more time consuming, difficult and expensive,
these reasons, of themselves, do not show that the trial judge abused his discretion
in denying [the plaintiffs] the tapes.""
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
14. Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 461-62.
15. 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1982).




20. Id. at 933.
[Vol. 66
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In 1995, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York reached a contrary conclusion inAnfi-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.21 In
Hasbro, the plaintiff moved to compel the production of the defendant's data
processing files.' The defendant objected to the production on two grounds: (1)
that the information sought had been produced in hard copy fomat; and (2) that
the defendant would have to create a computer program to retrieve and compile
the information from its files, a time consuming and costly endeavor.'
Notwithstanding the defendant's plausible arguments and the reality that the
plaintiff's request would impose substantial costs upon the defendant, the district
court held that "the law is clear that data in computerized form is discoverable
even if paper 'hard copies' of the information have been produced, and that the
producing party can be required to design a computer program to extracthe data
from its computerized business records."' 4
Three years later, the Seventh Circuit, in Sattar v. Motorola' adopted an
entirely different approach than that taken in the earlier Williams and Hasbro
decisions. The Sattar case involved a race discrimination claim brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 At the trial level, the plaintiff sought
production of more than 210,000 pages of e-mail in hard copy form.Y The
defendant had produced the e-mails.' However, production was in the form of
non-conventional computer tapes.' The information was inaccessible to the
plaintiff because he lacked the requisite equipment and software to review the
tapes.3" To resolve the discovery dispute, the trial court's order provided the
defendant with the option of either downloading the e-mails on conventional
computer disks or providing the plaintiff with the necessary equipment to review
the information."' The defendant downloaded the e-mails onto a computer hard
drive that it then loaned to the plaintiff for review? The Seventh Circuit affumed
the trial court's approach and found it to be "an entirely reasonable resolution of
[the plaintiff's] problem."'33 The evolution of the courts' resolutions of discovery





25. 138 F.3d 1164 (7thCir. 1998).
26. Id. at 1166.






33. Id. But see Fennell v. First Steps Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526 (lst Cir. 1996).
In Fennel, the plaintiff sued the defendant, the plaintiff's employer, alleging that the
5
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disputes involving electronic informationnot only demonstrates the courts' attempt
to embrace this new form of discovery, but also it illustrates that a litigant's
uncertainty in this area is primarily caused by the courts' dilemma in applying old
rules to new issues of law.
B. The Cost of Producing Computerized Infonnation
Setting aside the uncertainty a litigant faces as to the proper form of
producing electronic discovery, the respondent to a discovery request also faces
economic uncertainties-such as, who pays for the production? Generally, the
respondent bears the cost of gathering and reviewing responsive documents, while
the requesting party bears the cost of copying such documents. 4 Rules 34 and
26(b), however, permit courts to shift the costs of production between the parties
upon a showing of "undue burden or expense. 5 The interaction of these rules
grants courts the power to shift the financial burden of discovery where the courts,
in their discretion, deem appropriate.36 In making this determination, courts will
weigh the benefits and burdens of the discovery and "consider the needs of the
case,.., the importance of the issues at stake, the potential for finding relevant
material and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues. ' n
However, the application of this balancing test to the production of electronic
discovery raises novel issues, primarily because the costs associated with
producing electronically stored data are often far more excessive than the costs of
producing "traditional" writtenmaterials." Is arespondentrequiredtopayfor the
creation of a computer retrieval program? Does a court impose an undue burden
on the requesting party in requiring it to pay for the copying of hundreds of
thousands of e-mails, in addition to the copying ofrespondent's written discovery
materials? As with the manner of production of computerized information, courts
defendant discharged the plaintiff in retaliation for reporting a sexual harassment
complaint. Id. at 528. The plaintiff sought access to the defendant's hard drive to
determine whether the defendant was fabricating employee data. See id. at 532-33. The
First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling denying the plaintiff access to the
defendant's computer. See id. The court noted that the plaintiff's discovery request
would involve great risks and costs, including the risk of permanently affecting the
defendant's hard drive and network system. Id. at 533 n.8.
34. See Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in
Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 356 (2000).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
36. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 362-63 (1978).
37. Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (citing
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)).
38. See Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer
Age: Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs ofDiscovery ofElectronically StoredData,
57 WASL & LEE L. REv. 257, 262-65 (2000).
[Vol. 66
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have failed to agree on who should bear the costs of producing electronic
information.
The conflict appears to arise from the hesitancy of some courts to deviate
from the framework of discovery in civil litigation by shifting the costs of
gathering andreviewing responsive electronic discovery onto therequestingparty.
For example, inIn re BrandName Prescription DrugsAntitrust Litigation,9 the
court noted that:
[i]t would be a dangerous development in the law if new techniques for
easing the use of information became a hindrance to discovery or
disclosure in litigation. The use of excessive technical distinctions is
inconsistent with the guiding principle that information which is stored,
used, ortransmittedinnewforms shouldbe availablethrough discovery
with the same openness as traditional forms. The normal and
reasonable translation of electronic data into a form usable by the
discovering party should be the ordinary and foreseeable burden of a
respondent in the absence of a showing of extraordinary hardship."3
Notwithstanding that the cost of production would range between fifty-thousand
dollars and seventy-thousand dollars, and that the producing party would have to
create a computer retrieval program, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to
compel the defendant to produce more than thirty-millionpages of e-mails and to
bear the costs incurred as a result of the production.41 The court stated that, while
it seemed unfair to force a party to bear the cost of creating a retrieval program to
respond to a document request, "if a party chooses an electronic storage method,
the necessity for a retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable
risk,42
However, not all courts subscribe to the notion that the existing framework
for discovery in civil litigation is gospel and cannot be altered. Some courts have
39. Nos. 94 Civ. 897 & MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526, at *1 (N.D. IM. June 15,
1995).
40. Id. at *2.
41. Id. at *1.
42. Id. at *2. InBills v. Kennecot Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459,460 (D. Utah 1985), an
age discrimination case, theplaintiffs soughtproductionofdetailed employeeinformation
stored on the defendant's computer. The defendant agreed to produce the information in
either computer disk or hard copy form; however, the defendant refused to pay for the
associated costs. Id. The court, afterweighing the benefits and burdens of the discovery,
declined to shift the costs onto the plaintiffs. Id. at 462-64. The court noted that
"information stored in computers should be as freely discoverable as information not
stored on computers, so parties requesting discovery should not be prejudiced thereby,
and the party responding is usually in the best and most economical position to call up
its own computer stored data." Id. at 463-64.
7
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ordered the requesting party to bear the cost of reviewing and retrieving
computerized information,43 while other courts have recommended that the parties
split the cost of copying such documents.44 Perhaps, these courts recognize that
producing hundreds of thousands of e-mails and creating retrieval programs to
facilitate this process is a costly, and often an overwhelmingly arduous and
burdensome, task. Nonetheless, the dichotomy that exists among the courts
demonstrates that a litigant cannot predict, with certainty, his or her electronic
discovery costs.
C. The Production of Deleted Computerized Information
While courts consistently have held that electronic data on computer hard
drives is discoverable, to the surprise of many computer users and their lawyers,
courts not only have ordered the production of retrievable deleted computerized
information45 but also have imposed sanctions for such deletions.46 The source of
the surprise is that, contrary to many computer users' beliefs, deleting a computer
file or electronic communication does not erasethe information from the computer.
Many programs have automatic backup features that create and save a copy of the
file on which the user is working.47 However, even in the absence of a backup
copy, deleted information still can be recovered. When a file is "deleted," it is
marked in the computer's disk directory as "not used," thereby permitting the
computer to store new files in the space where the "deleted" data exists.48 The
deleted data, while no longer appearing on the user's computer directory, remains
undisturbed until the computer needs the space on the hard drive to save the
43. In re Brand Name, 1995 WL 360526, at *2; see supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Sattar v. Motorola, 138 F.3d 1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998) (approving
the trial court's recommendation that if the defendant was unable to provide the
computerized information on conventional computer disks or loan the plaintiff, the
requesting party, the necessary equipment to review the information, the parties each
would bear half of the cost of copying).
45. See Simon Property Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641-42
(S.D. Ind. 2000); Easley, McCaleb & Assocs., Inc. v. Penry, No. E-2663 (Ga. Super. Ct.
July 13, 1994).
46. See CrownLife Ins. Co. v. Craig, 995 F.2i 1376, 1383 (7th Cir. 1993); 111. Tool
Works v. Metro Mark Prods., 43 F. Supp. 2d 951, 962-63 (N.D. Ill. 1999); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 617 (D.N.J. 1997);
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90, 131 (D. Colo. 1996).
47. For an in-depth discussion and explanation of how computers transform and
store electronic information, see Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 34, at 333-35.
48. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 34, at 337-38.
[Vol. 66
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subsequent information.49 Thus, unlike paper documents, which can be shredded,
computer documents persist in their existence.
Similarly, deleting an e-mail message does not guarantee that the
communication has been erased. To permanently delete a message in a user's e-
mail directory, most e-mail programs require the user to perform a two-step
deletion.5" The user first must delete the message from his or her inbox and then
must delete the message from his or her e-mail deleted items folder, recycle bin,
or trash.51 This, however, does not guarantee that the message no longer exists.52
Most e-mail programs automatically save a copy of every message sent and
received by an e-mail account."3 Therefore, upon transmittal, one copy of the
message is saved by the sender's e-mail program, another copy is saved by the
recipient, and another copy is stored by the recipient's server.' Thus, multiple
copies of an e-mail message are saved onthe computers of both the sender and the
recipient, even if the message is "deleted" by both.
The longevity of deleted computerized documents and e-mail has led to
discovery requests seeking such information and court orders mandating their
production. For example, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, in Simon Property Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc.,55 held that
computer records, including records that have been deleted, are discoverable
documents subject to Rule 34.56 In granting the plaintiff's motion to compel the
deleted documents, the court placed the burden and expense of obtaining the
documents on the plaintiff and set forth guidelines for the taskV The court
49. The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum provided a layman's explanation of the
function of the "delete" key in his article In Defense of the DEt 'E Key. See James U.
Rosenbaum, In Defense of the DELETEKey, 3 GREENBAG2D 393,393 (2000), available
at http:/www.greenbag.org/rosenbaum deletekey.pdf (last modified Aug. 22, 2001).
Judge Rosenbaum explained:
For those with little knowledge, and less interest, a computer's DELETE key
acts somewhat like a thief who steals a card from the old library's card file.
When the card was in place, the librarian could decode the library's filing
system and find the book. If the card was gone, or unreadable, the book was
still in the library, but it could no longer be found amidst the library's stacked
shelves. In a computer, the "lost" book can be found with very little effort.
Id. at 393 n.1.
50. See Joan E. Feldman & Rodger I. Kohn, The Essentials of Computer





55. 194 F.RD. 639 (2000).
56. Id. at 640.
57. Id. at 641. The Simon Property court's guidelines were adopted from the
9
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ordered the plaintiffto select and pay an expert to inspect and copy the hard drives
of the computers in question.5" The defendant was permitted to object to the
plaintiff's selection, whereby the court would appoint the expert as an officer of
the court. 9 The expert then would recover and provide, in a "reasonably
convenient form,. . . all available word processing documents, electronic mail
messages, powerpoint or similar presentations, spreadsheets and similar files" to
the defendant's counsel.' ° The defense counsel would review the materials for
privileged documents and communications, and supplement its discovery
responses as necessary.61 At the close of litigation, the expert was to destroy all
records on the defendant's hard drives and confirm such destruction to the
satisfaction of the defendant.62
Likewise, in Easley, McCaleb & Associates, Inc. v. Perry,63 the Superior
Court of Georgia ordered the production of all files on the defendant's hard drives,
including deleted orrenamed files.' ThePerry court employed protocols virtually
identical to those utilized by the Simon Property Group court.6" The plaintiffwas
ordered to bear the costs of the retrieval, which included supplying the necessary
equipment and software.66 Both parties were permitted to designate a neutral
computer operator or technician to assist in the copying of the defendant's hard
drives.67 The recoverable information was to be compiled and presented to the
defendant to review for privileged and confidential materials; the non-privileged
and non-confidential data was to be produced to the plaintiff.68
Notwithstanding the obvious inconvenience in producing deleted
computerized information or the inevitable disruption to the functioning of a
corporation or business in complying with such a request, the destruction, deletion,
and failure to produce computerized information can subject an employer to
sanctions. While the intentional destruction of computer data or the willful refusal
to produce such discoverable records clearly may expose a litigant to sanctions,69
framework set forth in Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054-55 (S.D.
Cal. 1999).
58. Simon Property, 194 F.R.D. at 641.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 642.
62. Id.






69. For example, in Illinois Tool Works v. Metro Mark Products, 43 F. Supp. 2d
951,961 (N.D. Ill. 1999), the district court imposed sanctions on the defendant for its
"purposeful effort to prevent [the] plaintiff from obtaining the information from the...
[Vol. 66
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courts have imposed sanctions for the negligent deletion of such materials. For
example, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey imposed
a $1 million sanction and ordered the reimbursement of the plaintiff's attorneys'
fees due to, in part, the defendant's failure to disseminate an explicit, detailed
retention policy mandating the preservation of documents!' Although there was
no evidence ofwilful misconduct, the court foundthe defendant's "haphazard and
uncoordinated approach to document retention" a sufficient basis to impose such
a severe sanction- 1  Similarly, in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical
Industries," the United States District Court for the District of Colorado ordered
the reimbursement of the plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs for the defendant's
negligent deletion of some of its discoverable computer files.' Thus, the case law
illustrates that, beyond a formalized document retention policy that provides for
a specified retention period, employers should not delete or destroy computerized
information-or risk being penalized.
Although courts appear to be unified in their application ofRule 34 to deleted
electronic documents and communications, the Honorable James M. Rosenbaum
expressed his disagreement with the state of the law concerning electronic
discovery.74 In his article, In Defense of the DELETE Key, Judge Rosenbaum
opined "that the computer lies: it lies when it says delete." According to Judge
Rosenbaum, records that have been deleted by a computer user arenotnecessarily
the "inculpatory 'second set of books."' 76 Rather, they are often mere evidence
of the user's mistakes and imperfections, documents that twenty years earlier
would have been thrown in the wastebasket.' The problem that arises, and one
computer." Pursuant to a court order, the defendant was required "to preserve the
integrity of all computers that are at issue here without any spoliation ofanyinformation
contained therein." Id. at 960. Despite the defendant's repeated assertions that any
computer malfunctions were entirely accidental, the court held that certain aspects of the
physical condition of the computer indicated anintent to tamper with it. Id. at 957. The
defendant was required to reimburse the plaintiff for the reasonable fees and costs of the
plaintiff's computer expert, and the plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs
associated with its motion to compel and motion for sanctions. Id. at 962-63. In Croim
Life Insurance v. Craig, 995 F.2d 1376, 1383 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit
imposed sanctions upon the defendant for its failure to produce properly-requested
computer data, even though the computer data was not available in hard copy form.
70. In re Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm. Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.RtD. 598, 616-17
(D.N.J. 1997).
71. Id. at 615.
72. 167 F.R.D. 90 (D. Colo. 1996).
73. Id. at 112, 131.
74. See generally Rosenbaum, supra note 49.
75. Rosenbaum, supra note 49, at 396.
76. Rosenbaum, supra note 49, at 394.
77. Rosenbaum, supra note 49, at 394.
11
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of the reasons for the proliferation of discovery requests for "deep-sea fish[ing
for] snippets of deleted e-mails and deleted files," is that on the computer's hard
drive, this "cyber trash" deceptively looks like more.78 To remedy this problem,
Judge Rosenbaum suggests a "cyber statute of limitations" such that, absent
evidence of egregious behavior or an "objective record of systematic misconduct,"
courts would recognize that deleted computerized items are infact"ybertrash.'1 9
Although Judge Rosenbaum did not suggest a time period for this "eyber statute
of limitations" (as he noted that the length of time can be "set as arbitrarily" as
any other statute of limitations), the thrust of his argument was clear---"for the
law's purposes, delete would mean delete."8" Notwithstanding that Judge
Rosenbaum has yet to apply his proposal to a discovery dispute, employers should
heed his warning: "[T]he computer.., never forgets, and never forgives."'"
III. POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYERS
While e-mail technology offers speed and convenience, it also creates unique
risks in the employment environment.' With the click of a button, one can
forward an offensive or defamatory message to hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
company employees, exposing employers to possible defamation, discrimination,
or harassment claims.
What is it about e-mail that makes the ordinarily thoughtful person act
precipitously when he or she presses the "send" button? Part of the problem is
that people view e-mail much like an informal telephone conversation.' In many
instances, statements that are written in e-mail messages would never have been
written in a memorandum, correspondence, or document. Thesemessages maybe
fragmented (without the use of any sentence structure), include slang terms, gossip
or confidential employment information, and/or dispense with any or all of the
formalities generally accepted in a corporate atmosphere. E-mail also may be
forwarded or appear on a company's bulletin board for all employees to see, and
it can disguise harassing conduct that otherwise would be obvious if carried out
78. Rosenbaum, supra note 49, at 394.
79. Rosenbaum, supra note 49, at 395.
80. Rosenbaum, supra note 49, at 395.
81. Rosenbaum, supra note 49, at 395.
82. See Mark Grossman, Drafting an Acceptable Computer-Use Policy, How to
Protect Employers from Liability Due to Employee Misuse of E-Mail and the Internet,
N.J. L.J., Sept. 6, 1999, at 33; see also Alan Cohen, Keeping An Eye on Employee E-
mail, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1998, at 2; Stephen M. Foxrnan, Risks from Electronic
Communications-A GrowingProblem, THEMETROPOLITANCORP. COUNS., Sept 2000,
at 16.
83. See Grossman, supra note 82.
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face to face.' For example, an employee sending a co-worker forty-nine e-mails
during the course of sevenbusiness days maynot alert an employer to the possible
harassing conduct, but forty-nine trips to the co-worker's desk would.' Thus, the
informality of e-mail messages and their inadvertent disclosure may expose an
employer to significant liability.
A. E-mail, Discrimination, and Harassment
The widespread use of e-mail has changed the business world. Because it
reduces the need for telephone calls, written memoranda, and person-to-person
meetings, e-mail is an efficient and cost-saving tool for employers. E-mail has
also opened the door to telecommuting, an enticing option for many employees.
Yet, with all of its advantages, the emergence of e-mail in the workplace or, more
specifically, the misuse of e-mail in the workplace, has exposed employers to
significant liability for, among other things, discrimination and harassment. For
example, in 1997, the investment banking firm Morgan Stanley & Co. was sued
by two African-American employees due primarily to a racist e-mail.' Although
the court held that one racist e-mail was insufficient evidence to support a claim
for racially-hostile environment harassment, the court gave the plaintiffs leave to
amend their complaint' The case was later settled.' In Strauss v. Microsoft
Corp., 9 a sexual discrimination case, the plaintiffproffered e-mailmessages from
her supervisor containing sexually-suggestive remarks that were, in general,
offensive to women.9" The court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and concluded that the supervisor's behavior, including his e-mail
mess ages, could lead areasonablejury to conclude that the plaintiffwas the victim
of gender discrimination 9 1 Similarly, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois denied summaryjudgmentinasexualharassmentcase
in which the plaintiff received e-mail messages containing sexually-explicit and
suggestive images.' The plaintiff's supervisor was also alleged to have visited
84. See Lisa Stansky, Changing Shifts: Does Anyone Still WorkHere? As More
Jobs Move from the Traditional '9 to '5, Alternative Workstyles are Forcing
Redefinitions ofEmployment Law, 83 A.B.A. J 54, 58 (1997).
85. Id.
86. See Owensv. Morgan Stanley & Co.,No. 96 Civ. 9747,1997U.S. Dist.LEXIS
10351, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1997).
87. Id. at* 1-2.
88. See Cheryl Blackwell Bryson & Michelle Day, WorAplace &rveillance Poses
Legal, Ethicallssues, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at B8.
89. 856 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
90. Id. at 822-23.
91. Id. at 825.
92. See Coniglio v. City of Berwyn, No. 99 Civ. 4475, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9841, at *1 (N.D. IlL June 15,2000).
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pornographic Internet web sites in the workplace and in view of other employees.93
The court found that questions of fact existed as to whether the supervisor's
misuse of the Internet and the plaintiff's receipt of harassing sexual e-mails
constituted a hostile work environment. 4 Notwithstanding that some courts have
held that one harassing e-mail message alone is insufficient to establish a claim
of hostile environment harassment, employers and their employees should be
cautious in drafting e-mail messages."S Employers should develop an e-mail
policy that requires employees to be formal in their e-mail communications. The
policy should set forth guidelines and examples of what is and what is not an
acceptable e-mail message. Generally, the policy should inform employees that
e-mail messages should retain the same formality as a letter sent to a corporate
client. Furthermore, the policy should notify employees that their corporate or
business e-mail accounts are to be used solely for business purposes and that the
employer retains therightto monitorthe employees' e-mails to ensure compliance
with the policy. These disclosures are necessary to immunize the employer from
claims that the monitoring invades the employees' right to privacy." If employees
are told at the outset that the employer has the right to review their e-mails for
compliance purposes, the employees no longer have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of their e-mail messages.' Finally, corporations should
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Curtis v. DilMaio, 46 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Owens v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 Civ. 9747, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10351, at *7-8
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1997); Harleyv. Michael McCoach, 928 F. Supp. 533, 540-41 (E.D.
Pa. 1996).
96. See infra note 102.
97. Unlike public employees, employees of private corporations generally do not
have a right to privacy at work. See, e.g., United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398
(4th Cir. 2000) (no expectation of privacy regarding information on an employer's
computer used by an employee); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (no expectation of privacy in e-mail messages sent to other employees through an
employer-operated e-mail system); see also Bohachv. Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232,1234-35
(D. Nev. 1996) (no expectation of privacy in telephone pager messages stored on an
employer's computer). Courts that have considered the issue have focused on whether
the private employee's expectation of privacy in the workplace was "reasonable." While
applicable federal law provides several exceptions under which employers who provide
e-mail and voicemail services to their employees via private networks may monitor those
communications, the method and scope of the employer's monitoring program, as well
as its demonstrated "legitimate" business need, is central to a court's determination as to
whether the monitoring is permissible under certain exceptions. Additionally, while an
employer may not monitor employee communications where services are provided
through an outside entity, such as MCI mail, without the employee's consent, the
specificity of any such consent and the implementation and maintenance of a regular
monitoring programis critical to preserving the employee's consent. In California, courts
[Vol. 66
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hold training sessions for their managers about their e-mail policy so that the
managers effectively can communicate the policy to corporate employees and
assist in its enforcement
B. E-mail and Defamation Claims
To state a prima facie case for defamation, a statement of fact must be: (1)
false and defamatory; (2) wrongly published to a third person; and (3) injurious
to the plaintiff's reputation in the community.' Normally, a plaintiffmust plead
and prove special damages, ie., specific instances of pecuniary loss due to the
damage to his or her reputation. However, New York, for example, "recognizes
a limited category of statements to be [defamation] per se which do not require
pleading and proving special damages. Among these statements it is well settled
that 'a writing which tends to disparage a person in... his l profession or trade'
is [defamation] per se." Courts have been cautious, however, in finding
defamatory e-mail messages actionable.100
Most states provide for some form of qualified immunity privilege to
otherwise meritorious claims for defamation.101 A statement is protected by the
qualified privilege where it is made by someone who has an interest or duty in
making itto those having a common interest in its subject matter." A defendant
have interpreted the state constitutional right to privacy to include actions against both
public and private entities. See, e.g., Valley Bank of Nev. v. Super. Ct, 542 P.2d 977,
979-80 (Cal. 1975); Luck v. S. Pao. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627-29 (Ct. App.
1990). However, employee monitoring is subject to a "balancing test" where the
employee's privacy interest must "be specifically identified and carefully compared with
competing or countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interest." Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994). The employee may rebut the employer's
justifications for monitoring by showing that the employer could have used less intrusive
methods to obtain the information sought Id. at 657.
98. See Levin v. McPhee, 917 F. Supp. 230,236 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
99. Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Nichols v. Item
Publishers, Inc., 132 N.E.2d 860, 862 (N.Y. 1956)).
100. See Lianv. Sedgwick James of N.Y., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 644,651 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (holdingthatan e-mail sentbya supervisorto other departmental members stating
that the plaintiff had agreed to seek other employment was not defamatory per se);
Morrow v. H Morrow, Inc., 911 P.2d 964, 968 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the
accidental company-wide publication of a defamatory memorandum, not intended to be
available on a common drive, was not adequate publication).
101. See, e.g., Weldyv. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 985 F.2d 57,62 (2d Cir. 1993);
Fosterv. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153,157 (N.Y. 1996); Libermanv. Gelstein, 605 N.E.2d
344, 349 (N.Y. 1992). Similarly, Texas recognizes a qualified privilege, see Boze v.
Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 1995), as does Indiana, see van de Leuv v.
Methodist Hosp. of Ind., Inc., 642 N.E.2d 531, 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
102. Some states that recognize a qualified privilege in communications by an
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abuses its privilege where the statement is shown to be false and published: (1)
with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard as to its truth; (2) with common
malice; or (3) outside the scope of the privilege."°
For example, communications between managers regarding the review of an
employee's job performance and the preparation of documents regarding an
employee's termination are protected by a qualified privilege."' Similarly, an
employee reference given by a former employer to a prospective employer is
protected by the qualified privilege." 5 However, a qualified privilege may be
overcome if the statement was made with actual malice-that is, with knowledge
of its falsity and a reckless disregard for its truth."'
C. Postings and Bulletin Boards
Electronic company bulletin boards are potentially the riskiest form of
electronic communication for employers. While they can be a cost-effective and
convenient way to reach many employees with up-to-date information, ranging
from work schedules to upcoming, company-sponsored employee events,
electronic bulletin boards also canbe aplace where employees "post" defamatory
or discriminatory messages about co-workers. These postings may impute
liability to an employer as the bulletin board provider if a court finds that the
employer is a "publisher" with editorial control. While there is no case law on
employer concerning an employee to persons having a corresponding interest, include but
are not limited to: Texas, New York, Connecticut, Indiana, and Maine. See Boze, 912
F.2d at 806; Weldy, 985 F.2d at 62; Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm. Inc., 662
A.2d 89, 104 (Conn. 1995); van de Leuv, 642 N.E.2d at 535; McCullough v. Visiting
Nurse Serv. of S. Me., Inc., 691 A.2d 1201, 1204-05 (Me. 1997).
103. See, e.g., Meloffv. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 92 Civ. 7126, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12264, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1999) (citing Weldy, 985 F.2d at 62).
104. Torosyan, 662 A.2d at 104; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
593, 596 cmt. d (1977).
105. See van de Leuv, 642 N.E.2d at 535 (citing Chambers v. Am. Trans Air, Inc.,
577 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)); see also Boze, 912 F.2d at 806.
106. See Torosyan, 662 A.2d at 104. In Torosyan, for example, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's findings that:
[the] defendant falsely attributed the plaintiff's discharge to his falsifying of
company documents ... that the plaintiff was defamed as to his business
reputation... [that] there was sufficient publication of the allegation both
among the several supervisors present at his discharge and by virtue of the
written memorandum prepared at the time of his discharge and placed in his
personnel file.
Id. at 102; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 600 (1977); cf Meloff, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12264, at * 11-12 (holding that a memorandum sent by e-mail notifying
company managers, who worked with the plaintiff, that she was terminated for credit card
fraud was not an abuse of qualified privilege); van de Leuv, 642 N.E.2d at 535.
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point, one may look to court decisions and federal legislation regarding postings
and online service providers (COSPs") for possible guidance.
Much of modem case law with regard to "postings" has its roots in the New
York Supreme Court's decision in Stratton Oaknont v. Prodigy Services Co."0'
Prior to Stratton Oakraont, courts held that OSPs that posted e-mail messages
over their services would not be held liable for their defamatory or offensive
content" For example, in Cubby v. CompuServe, Inc.,"° the court found for the
OSP, holding that, because CompuServe had no more editorial control over a
documentthan apublic library ornewsstand, itwas nomore liable for defamatory
statements made by a distributor.' Similarly, in Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co.,"'
the court held that the Dow Jones News/Retrieval Service was a modem way for
the public to obtain "up-to-the-minute-news" and, thus, was entitled to the same
protection afforded a distributor.'
D. Publishers versus Distributors
The extent to which employers can escape liability for defamatory or
harassing messages posted on their company bulletin boards by their own
employees may be analogous to liability imposed on OSPs for messages posted
through their services. The line between liability and non-liability for OSPs is
drawn among three classifications-publishers, distributors, and common
carriers." 3 An entity that exercises some degree of editorial control over the
disseminationofdefamatorymaterial generally will be liablefor its publication." 4
For example, a newspaper may be liable for defamation if a letter to the editor it
published contains false and defamatory statements."S An entity that distributes
but does not exercise any editorial control over defamatory material only may be
liable if such entity knew orhadreasonto know of the defamation-such as, news
vendors, books stores, and libraries.11 6 However, an entity that merely acts as a
passive conduit for the transmission of defamatory liability, such as a telephone
107. No. 94-31063, 1995 N.Y. visc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. CL May 24, 1995).
For a discussion ofStratton Oakanont, see infra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
108. See Cubbyv. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
109. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
110. Id. at 140.
111. 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ. Ct. 1987).
112. Id. at 340.
113. See Jonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Limiting Tort Liabilityfor
Online Third-Party Content Under Section 230 of the Communications Act, 52 FED.
CoinR. L.J. 647,651-52 (2000).
114. See id.
115. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139.
116. Id. at 140.
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company, is not subject to defamation liability, even if such entity knew or had
reason to know of the defamation. 117
InStratton Oakmont, the plaintiffs, a securities investment banking firm and
its president, asserted that Prodigy was liable for allegedly defamatory statements
made about the plaintiffs by an unidentified user of one of Prodigy's bulletin
boards.' In 1994, an unidentified party, using the identification code of a
Prodigy employee, posted defamatory statements on the "Money Talk" bulletin
boards, stating that Stratton Oakmont and its president had committed criminal
acts.1 9 Contrary to long-standing precedent, the court found that Prodigy
exercised sufficient editorial control over its computer bulletin board to render it
a publisher with the same responsibilities as a newspaper. 2° The online
community and Capitol Hill criticized the decision at a time when Congress was
considering telecommunications reform legislation and the Communication
DecencyAct of 1996 ("CDA").'2 Inresponseto the decision, Congress included
a section in the CDA that effectively reversed Stratton Oakmont."' Ultimately,
Stratton Oakmont will be remembered more for the Congressional reaction to the
decision than for its reversal of precedent.
In promulgating the CDA, Congress sought to remove the disincentives to
self-regulation created by the New York court's decision in Stratton Oakmont.2'
The CDA creates federal immunity for any state law cause of action that would
hold OSPs liable for information originating from a third party. 4 Specifically,
117. Lunneyv. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 164, 1999 N.Y. LEXIS 3746, at *13 (N.Y.
Dec. 2, 1999) (citing Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1974), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000)). In Anderson, a minister in a religious sect sued a
telephone company for failing to stop an individual from using leased telephone
equipment to record messages that allegedly defamed the minister. See Anderson, 320
N.E.2d at 648. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the telephone company
was not the publisher and not subject to liability, even though the plaintiff had notified
the phone company about the messages and the phone company refused to stop the
recordings. Id. at 649.
118. See Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,No. 94-31063, 1995 N.Y. Miso.
LEXIS 229, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
119. Id.
120. Id. at *10.
121. Friedman & Buono, supra note 113, at 653.
122. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (Supp. V 1999) ("No cause of action may be
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent
with this section.").
123. See James F. Brelsford & Nicole A. Wong, Online Liability Issues:
Defamation, Privacy and Negligent Publishing, 564 PLI/Pat 231, 239 (1999) ("The
intent of the section [509(c)(1) of the CDA] is to remove the liability 'penalty' Stratton
Oakmont imposed on those who exercised some control over online content generated by
others, including third-party statements.").
124. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (Supp. V 1999) ("No cause of action may be
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§ 230(c)(1) provides: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker ofanyinformation provided by another
information contentprovider."'I Section230(f)(2) defines "interactive computer
service" as "any information'service, system or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Intemet."'75
Finally, § 230(f)(3) defines "information content provider" as "any information
service or any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service."''
E. Decisions After the CDA
Decisions since the CDA's promulgation consistently have held in favor of
OSPs. In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., z the Fourth Circuit gave an expansive
reading of§ 230.1' InZeran, the plaintiff claimed an unidentified thirdpartyhad
posted statements on a message board advertising T-shirts that glorified the
Oklahoma City bombing." Those interested in purchasing the T-shirts were
instructed to call the plaintiff, whose home phone number was listed."' Plaintiff
complained to America Online ("AOL"), which delayed taking themessage down
and refused to issue a retraction or screen for similar subsequent postings.' 2 The
courtheld that § 230 pre-empted the plaintiff's defamation and related claims, that
AOL could not be treated as the "publisher" of the statements, and that even
AOL's decision not to remove the posting did not render it a publisher."3
In Blumenthal v. Drudge,"' Sidney Blumenthal, a former journalist and
White House aide, and his wife, sued Matt Drudge, a publisher of an electronic
publication known as the Drudge Report, and AOL for defamation and other
claims for reporting that "top GOP operatives" believed that "Blumenthal ha[d]
a spousal abuse past."'35 The plaintiff asserted that AOL, which had entered into
brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent
with this section.").
125. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
126. 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(2) (Supp. V 1999).
127. 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3) (Supp. V 1999).
128. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
129. Id. at 330-34.
130. Id. at 329.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 332.
134. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
135. See Brelsford & Wong, supra note 123, at 240 (quoting Blumenthal, 992 F.
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a license agreement with Drudge by which it paid him a monthly royalty in
exchange for the right to make the Drudge Report available to AOL users, jointly
published the allegedly defamatory statements with Drudge and, thus, was not
immune from liability pursuant to § 23 0.136 The plaintiffs also alleged that AOL
could be held liable on the grounds that Drudge was an employee or agent of
AOL. 37 Ingranting AOL's summaryjudgmentmotion, the court held that the fact
that AOL had the right to make changes in the Drudge Report was not sufficient
to make it ajoint publisher of the report. 38 Rather, the plaintiffs were required to
present evidence that AOL had some role in creating or developing the
information in the Drudge Report and failed to do so. 39
In Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc.,4 a designer and
manufacturer of corporate finance computer software sued AOL for defamation
and negligence."' In its complaint, the plaintiff asserted that AOL defamed it on
three occasions whenAOL published incorrect information concerning Ben Ezra's
stock price and share volume.142 The plaintiff also claimed that AOL failed to
exercise reasonable care in the manipulation, alteration, and change of the stock
information."' The court granted summary judgment for the defendant and held
that AOL acted solely as an interactive OSP,1" and, therefore, was immune from
suitunder the CDA. 45 While there are no employer bulletin board cases reported
under the CDA, the Act may provide guidance for future cases involving
electronic bulletin boards provided by employers.
F Electronic Bulletin Board Postings Case
Not Decided Under the CDA
In the recent electronic bulletin board defamation postings case of Blakey v.
ContinentalAirlines, Inc.,46 which was not decided under the CDA, the Appellate
Supp. at 45).
136. See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 49-50.
137. See id. at 50.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 52-53.
140. 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000).
141. See id. at 983.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 986. The court found that "[b]y deleting the allegedly inaccurate stock
quotation information, [the djefendant was simply engaging in the editorial functions
Congress sought to protect." Id.
145. Id.; see also John Does v. Franco Prod., No. 99 Civ. 7785, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8645, at *14 (N.D. I11. June 22, 2000).
146. 730 A.2d 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), rev'd, 751 A.2d 538 (2000).
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Division of the New Jersey Superior Court found for the employer. In Blakey,
Continental provided a computer bulletin board that was only accessible by its
employees.147 Defamatory remarks were published on the bulletin board (the
'Formn")." The plaintiff claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work
environment in violation of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination
C(.AD").149 Specifically, she sought to hold Continental vicariously libel for the
allegedly defamatory remarks of her co-workers. 5 The superior court found that
the Forum was not a workplace under LAD and that Continental could notbe held
liable for the messages that appeared on the Forum because Continental had no
duty to police the Internet or to control its employees' activities in a non-
workplace." Although this case was not decided under the CDA, it is illustrative
of the treatment courts may give employer-created bulletin boards.
G. Disparate Treatment and Online Recntiting
1. E-recruiting with Resume Scanning Software
The potential for disparate treatment claims with electronic recruiting ('e-
recruiting") is another risk associated with the use of technology. Emerging
technologyraises new issues inthe area ofpersonnel recruiting, including whether
employers using software that automaticallyscans resumes forkeywords or skills,
or whether employers using the Internet as their sole method of recruiting violate
federal equal employment opportunity laws."
The issue arose mostrecentlyinRivers v. Walt Disney Co.,' 53 in which four
African-American employees claimed that the Walt Disney Corporation used
resume scanning software to discriminate against applicants and employees
unlawfiflly on the basis of race.' 4 The complaint inRivers alleged that Disney's
147. See id. at 856.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 856-57; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001)
(making it an unlawful practice for an employer to discriminate in conditions of
employment).
150. See Blakely, 730 A.2d at 857.
151. Id. at 869. Further, the trial court found that Continental had no control over
the Forum, that Continental did not make it a requirement for its employees to use the
Forum, and that employees had to pay a service fee to CompuServe and have their o\vn
computers to access it. Id.
152. See Nadya Aswad, Emplo)yzent: Resume Scanning, Tracking Software
Raises New Discrimination Issues, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 17, 1998, at C-1.
153. 980 F. Supp. 1358 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
154. Id. at 1359. A similar suit was filed inthe United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida in Hightower v. Walt Disney WorldCo.,No. 97-661-Civ-Orl-
18B, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6297 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17,2000).
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applicant screening procedure, using a computer software program designed by
Resumix, Inc., to electronically scan resumes in a database, discriminated on the
basis of race."' The complaint further elaborated that the Resumix software
electronically searched resumes in a database on the basis of "key words,"
identifying and activating resumes that matched and contained the selected
keywords."' "Because of the different cultures and backgrounds, African-
American applicants [were] likely to use different key words on their resumes than
white applicants," the complaint went on to allege, noting that because the
Resumix system is based on the primarily white culture and because "it searches
for key words widely used within that culture, it discriminates against African-
American applicants and employees.""' 7
2. Access to Computers
In addition to disparately-selective software, the Internet has the potential to
cause problems if employers who post jobs there fail to use a multifaceted search
strategy including traditional means ofrecruiting. This may foreclose recruitment
of certain racial groups, as well as older workers, who are much less conversant
with web "surfing" and less likely to have access to an employer's online
recruiting efforts, and it may open employers up to disparate treatment claims.
IV. TECHNOLOGY AND ITS IMPACT
ON PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
The development of technology in recent years has raised new concerns
regarding the protection of privileged information transmitted through e-mail
systems, cellular telephones, and the Internet. These issues include whether the
attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine are waived by sending
confidential information via e-mail, whether an inadvertent disclosure of
confidential information by e-mail waives privilege, and whether the confidences
and secrets of a client are truly protected when information is relayed via modem
modes of communication instead of by more traditional means.
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine
The attorney-client privilege applies only to communications from the client
to the attorney "made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and directed to an
attorney who has been consulted for that purpose." 1" Conversely, for the
155. See Aswad, supra note 152.
156. See Aswad, supra note 152.
157. See Aswad, supra note 152 (internal citations omitted).
158. Rossiv. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540N.E.2d 703,706 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting
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privilege to apply when the communications are made from attorney to client,
whether ornot inresponse to aparticularrequest, itmust bemade for thepurpose
of facilitating the rendition of legal advice or services, in the course of a
professional relationship."9
The attomey-clientprivilege applies to communications between a client and
his or her attorney or a corporation and its attorney. 6 In this regard, the privilege
only applies if the attorney is acting as a legal advisor.' Purely business
communications do not fall within the privilege." Thus, the risk exists that
attorneys who perform multiple roles within a corporation may be found to have
been acting in a strictly business capacity, rather than as a legal advisor." If
acting as alegal advisor, the attomey-clientprivilege willprotect communications
between the corporation's attorney and high- or low-level corporate employees.'"
In the corporate context, the attorney-client privilege belongs to. the
corporation.'65 The privilege is subject to waiver by the corporation over the
objections of the counsel who provided the advice because the corporation itself
(butnot its individual officers or employees) can choose to waive the privilege."u
Byway of example, the New York Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that a lawyer employed or retained by an organization must explain to employees
and other "constituents" that he or she is the lawyer for the organization and not
for any of the constituents when "it appears that the organization's interests may
differ from those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing."' 6
When dealing with documents, the most significant privilege is the work
product doctrine. When the work product doctrine attaches to a particular
document, attorneys legally may withhold the document from production in
response to a discovery request."s
InNew York, for example, the workproduct doctrine in civil cases is divided
into two statutory provisions. First, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
Section 3 101(c) provides that the "work product of an attorney" is absolutely




162. SeeEDNASELANEPSTEIN, THEAToRNEY-CLIENTPRIVILEGE ANDTHEWORK
-PRODUCTDOCTRJNE 95-99 (3d ed. 1997).
163. See Cooper-Rutter Assoc., Inc. v. Anchor Nat'I Life Ins. Co., 563 N.Y.S.2d
491,492 (App. Div. 1990).
164. SeeRadovicv. City ofNew York, 642 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
165. See EPSTEIN, supra note 162, at 166.
166. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 798 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir.
1986); Dooleyv. Boyle, 531 N.Y.S.2d 161, 167 (Sup. CL 1988). See generally Tekni-
Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 674 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1996).
167. N.Y. CoDE OF PROF'L REsPONSmBirLyDR 5-109 (1998).
168. See EPSTEIN, supra note 162, at 289-9 1.
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exempt from discovery.169 Although Section 3101(c) does not require the
attorney's protected workproduct be prepared in anticipation of litigation, courts
have imposed this prerequisite. 7° The scope of the work product privilege has
been narrowly confined by courts to those materials that are uniquely the product
of a lawyer's learning and professional skills, such as materials that reflect legal
research, analysis, conclusions, legal theory, or strategy."" A lawyer's
recollections and notes of interviews with witnesses also fall within this
category." 2 The work product immunity applies not only to material prepared for
the litigation in progress but also to materials that were prepared in anticipation
of litigation. 173
The second work product immunity contained in Section 3101(d)(2) applies
to materials prepared solely in anticipation of litigation or for trial, by or for
another party, or by or for that other party's representative (including an attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). 74 The "solely" requirement has
been interpreted narrowly. Thus, for example, investigatory reports that are
motivatedbothby potential litigation and business considerations are not protected
from discovery. 7
Unfortunately, as in Hickman v. Taylor,'76 trial preparation materials are
only conditionally immune from discovery. Thus, immunity can be overcome
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has a substantial need for the
materials in preparation of the case and is unable, without undue hardship, to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. 77 For example,
in Gaglia v. Wells,178 the defendant's statement to a liability insurer was
discoverable based upon showing that the defendant could no longer recall the
accident and the plaintiff suffered from amnesia. 79
This privilege frequently will come into play when an employer's agent is
conducting an internal investigation at the request and direction of the employer
or the employer's counsel in anticipation of litigation. The investigative materials
are conditionally immune from disclosure unless the adversary would not be able
169. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(c) (MoKirney 1991 & Supp. 2001); see Corcoranv. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 542 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (App. Div. 1989).
170. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Staffa, 585 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 (App. Div. 1992); In re
Bekins Storage Co., 460 N.Y.S.2d 684, 689-90 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
171. See Hoffman v. Ro-San Manor, 425 N.Y.S.2d 619, 622 (App. Div. 1980).
172. See Corcoran, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 643-44.
173. See Beasock v. Dioguardi Enters., Inc., 499 N.Y.S.2d 560, 560 (App. Div.
1986).
174. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d)(2) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 2001).
175. See Carlo v. Queens Transit Corp., 428 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (App. Div. 1980).
176. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
177. See Barton v. Diesel Constr. Co., 365 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App. Div. 1975).
178. 490 N.Y.S.2d 829 (App. Div. 1985).
179. Id. at 830.
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to obtain the equivalent of the materials by other means (for example, in a
situation where a witness is no longer available to testify)."
B. E-mail, Cellular Telephones, and the Internet, and Their Impact on
Privileged Communications
1. Three Approaches Utilized by the Courts Regarding
New Technology and Privileged Communications
The primary concern with advancing technology and its effect on privileged
communications is whether the use of e-mail, cellular telephones, and the
transmission ofconfidentialmaterials over the Internet will increase the likelihood
that a court will findthat the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine has
been waived, particularly in situations of inadvertent disclosure.' Courts have
addressed the "accidental" waiver issue with burgeoning technology by utilizing
one of three already-established approaches. These approaches include: (1) the
strict liability test; (2) the intent test; and (3) the case-specific test."s Although
the application of these tests to questions of privilege is not new, the application
of the tests to modem modes of communication is novel. As a result, lawyers
should take precautionary measures whenever communicating with a client via e-
mail, cellular telephones, or the Internet. In order to determine what precautions
a lawyer should take, a brief synopsis of the three applicable tests is necessary.
First, the strict liability test holds that disclosure of any kind, including
inadvertent disclosure, constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine." The theory supporting this analysis is that once
information is disclosed, it forever will remain disclosed. Therefore, any prior
privilege to keep such information confidential is destroyed.'s,
The second approach is the intent test. Under this test, confidential
communications maybe waived only ifthe disclosing party had the specific intent
180. See id.; Barton, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
181. See generally Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Carter v. Goldberg, 498 U.S. 811 (1990); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v.
McCulloch, 168 F.R.D. 516, 521 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey,
109 F.R1D. 323, 328 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
182. See 8 JOHNH. WIGMORE, EVIDENCEINTRIALS ATCOMMON LAV § 2290 (J.T.
McNaughton, rev. 1961); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais, 160 F.RID. 437,
442 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp.,
138 F.R1D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va. 1991); Helman v. Murray's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp.
1099, 1104 (D. DeL 1990); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. Cal.
1985); see also infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
183. See 8 WIGfORE, supra note 182, § 2290.
184. See United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D.
Mich. 1954).
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to waive the privilege.1" Courts utilizing this approach opine that waiver of the
attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine requires some degree of intent.
Absent such intent, waiver is not possible."8
The last approach, which is utilized by a majority of the courts, is the case-
specific test. 87 This test focuses on the totality of the circumstances. Many
factors are considered under this test, including: "(1) the reasonableness of
precautions taken to prevent disclosure; (2) the amount of time taken to remedy
the error; (3) the scope of discovery; (4) the extent of disclosure; and (5) the
overriding issue of fairness."" Therefore, the measure of reasonable precautions
takenby an attorney to keep the secrets of his or her client determines whether any
kind of disclosure constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or of the
work product doctrine.'89
2. E-mail
E-mail is an electronic system that allows immediate and efficient
communicationbetweenindividuals. Intoday's legal environment, attorneys often
transmit confidential client information over the Intemetvia unencrypted e-mail."0
The transmission of such information raises evidentiary issues of privilege and
potential ethical concerns.
a. Evidentiary Rules Regarding E-mail and Privileged Communications
State laws regarding new modes of communication and their effect on the law
of privilege are slowly developing. For example, on July 7, 1998, the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules was amended to clarify New York's law regarding
the electronic communication of privileged information) 9 Section 4548 was
added, which provides:
185. See Helman, 728 F. Supp. at 1104.
186. See Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951,954 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
187. See generallyHartfordFire Ins. Co., 109 F.R.D. at 329 ("Rather, themodem
trend seems to be towards a case by case determination of waiver based on a
consideration of all the circumstances. The majority of cases do hold, or take for granted,
that inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents may waive the privilege.").
188. Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1993).
189. When applying the case-specific test, some courts will consider Fourth
Amendment principles regarding a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in order
to determine whether inadvertent disclosure constitutes a waiver. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
190. Encryption is a security measure that jumbles an e-mail message, thereby
rendering it unreadable in order to protect its contents from an unintended recipient.
191. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
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No communication privileged under this article shall lose its privileged
character for the sole reason that it is communicated by electronic
means or because persons necessary for the delivery or facilitation of
such electronic communication may have access to the content of the
commumication."1
New York was one of the first states to pass an electronic communications
law.' The CPLR Committee of the New York State Bar Association proposed
this new statute, arguing "e-mail communications have become effective means
of communications which should be encouraged."" This legislative finding
essentially provides assurance to attorneys that e-mail transmissions of privileged
information have a reasonable expectation ofprivacy. This, in turn, supports the
contention that e-mail transmissions are protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Several state judicial opinions also have supported this contention, stating that e-
mail communications should be analogized to and treated the same as othermore
traditional means of communication. 5 Nevertheless, attorneys should proceed
cautiously when sending privileged information via e-mail because ethical
considerations remain unsettled. The New York State Bar Association's
Supporting Statement to the new section was clear in stating:
[Section 4548 does not] deal with the duty of a professional to preserve
clients' secrets. While a communication over E-mail may be
sufficiently confidential that it does not waive the evidentiary privilege
that attaches to it, the obligation of a professional to keep confidences
may require that certain highly confidential matters not be
communicated in this form, even though it would be privileged."t
192. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
193. California also passed an electronic communications law in 1994. See CAl.
Evw. CODE § 952 (West 1995). Its lawprovides: "[a] communication between a client
and his or her lawyer is not deemed lacking in confidentiality solely because the
communication is transmitted by facsimile, cellular telephone, or other electronic means
between the client and his or her lawyer." CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West 1995).
194. N.Y. St B. Ass'n, CPLR Comm., PrivilegedE-AMailProposal: CPLR §4547
supporting statement, available at
http://www.nysba.orgonmnittees/cplr/library/4547.htm (last visited Nov. 14,2001).
195. See, e.g., McCook Metals L.L.C. v. Alcoa, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 242,255 (N.D.
111 2000); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
196. N.Y. St. B. Ass'n, CPLR Comm.,PrivilegedE-MfailProposal: CPLR§4547
supporting statement, available at
http://www.nysba.org/committees/cplr/library/4547.html (last visited Nov. 14,2001).
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b. Ethical Rules Regarding E-mail and Privileged Communications
Although information transmitted via e-mail retains its privileged character,
attorneys must ensure that they are abiding by the ethical rules of professional
conduct. The American Bar Association ("ABA") and several state ethics
committees have addressed this issue in formal written opinions.
The transmission of unencrypted confidential information may raise ethical
concerns because the ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) prohibits
an attorney from revealing confidential client information absent the client's
consent after consultation and imposes a duty on a lawyer to take reasonable steps
under the circumstances to protect such information against unauthorized
disclosure."9
On March 10, 1999, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility allayed the concerns of many attorneys and stated that
an attorney may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating his or her ethical
obligations."' The Committee based its opinion on the fact that Model Rule 1.6
only requires a lawyer to choose a means of communication in which the lawyer
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.' An absolute expectation of privacy is
notrequired. The Committee found that unencrypted e-mail communications sent
over the Internet pose no greater risk of interception or disclosure than other
modes of communication commonly relied upon as having a reasonable
expectation of privacy."0
The Committee did note, however, that, if the confidential client information
being transmitted is so highly sensitive that extraordinary protective measures are
warranted, the lawyer should consult with the client as to whether another mode
of delivery is warranted and should follow the client's instruction as to the mode
of transmission.01 In such a highly sensitive situation, an attorney probably
197. See MODEL RULEs oF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 1.6(a)(1980). See generally Iowa
Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof 1 Ethics and Conduct, Op. 96-01 (1996) (holding that "sensitive
material" sent across the Internet via e-mail by an attorney must be encrypted, and, if it
cannot be encrypted, the attorney must inform the client of the risks the e-mail
communication poses on the expectation of privacy); S.C. St. B. Ass'n Ethics Advisory
Comm., Advisory Op. 94-27 (1995) (opining that there is little expectation of privacy
when transmitting e-mail over the Internet).
198. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413
(1999).
199. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1980).
200. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413
(1999); see also United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(holding that expectation of privacy for e-mail is analyzed in the same manner as a letter
sent via U.S. mail).
201. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413
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should not use e-mail as a means of communicating with his or her client without
utilizing additional safeguards.
InNewYork, DR4-101 ofthe Code ofProfessionalResponsibilityprovides,
in relevant part, that "a lawyer shall not knowingly... [r]eveal a confidence or
secret of a client."2°2  The CPLR Committee of the New York State Bar
Association, commenting on this Section of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, cautioned:
[T]he obligation of a professional to keep confidences may require that
certain highly confidential matters not be communicated [by e-mail],
even though it would be privileged. A confession of a crime, the
communication of a sensitive trade secret or similar information
ordinarily should be communicated in a method designed to ensure that
no third party has access to the information under any circumstances."'
Therefore, the mode of communication chosen by an attorney to transmit
information to his or her client, or a third party, whether it be through electronic,
written, or oral means, must be appropriate under the circumstances to protect the
confidences and secrets of the client.
Most states that have been presented with this issue have found that e-mail
communications with a client are not aper se violation of the rules of ethics.'
For example, the Illinois State Bar Association, in an advisory opinion, found that
an attorney does not violate its ethical rules by communicating with his or her
client via e-mailbecause there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, which is no
less reasonable than the expectation of privacy for telephone calls. 2 s Moreover,
the interception ofe-mail through fraudulent means or for fraudulent purposes has
no effect on the privileged character of an e-mail transmission because such
conduct is illegal under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
The District of Columbia BarAssociation also addressed this issue and found
that confidential e-mail communications do not violate its ethical rules of
(1999).
202. N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPoNsmmry DR 4-101 (2000).
203. N.Y. St. B. Ass'n, CPLR Comm., Privileged E-Mail Proposal: CPLR § 4547
supporting statement, available at
http:/Avww.nysba.orgleommittees/cplr/library/4547.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
204. See infra notes 205-11.
205. See M. St. B. Ass'n, Op. 96-10 (1997).
206. See id.; see also ABA Comm. onEthics and Pro?1 Responsibility, Formal Op.
99-413 (1999) (finding that "[it is not ... reasonable to require that a mode of
communicating information must be avoided simply because interception is
technologically possible, especially when unauthorized interception or dissemination of
the information is a violation of law").
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conduct." 7 It noted, however, that, in instances where communications require a
"higher level of security," the use of encrypted e-mail transmissions should be
considered and will be adequate to protect confidentiality.0 '
Similar opinions have been expressed by the Vermont Bar Association,"° the
Alaska Bar Association,210 and the Pennsylvania BarAssociation.2" Themajority
of state bar associations agree, however, that under some circumstances,
unencrypted e-mail communications may violate a lawyer's ethical obligations to
his or her client.
3. Cellular Telephones
Although the use of cellular telephones has facilitated communications
between attorney and client, it also has created new legal risks concerning the
interception of such communications. Congress reacted to this new technological
development by passing ECPA in 1996. ECPA provides: "no otherwise
privileged wire, oral or electronic communication intercepted in accordance with,
or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged
character.' 212
Despite ECPA's enactment, state ethics committees, as well as the ABA,
have issued their own opinions regarding the dissemination of confidential
communications over cellular telephones. In New York, the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York wrote a formal opinion, wherein it stated: "[a]
lawyer should exercise caution when engaging in conversations containing or
concerning client confidences or secrets by cellular or cordless telephones or other
communication devices readily capable of interception, and should consider taking
steps sufficient to ensure the security of such conversations."' 3 Several other
states have taken a similar position. 214
Furthermore, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
expressed its concerns about the use of cellular telephones to transmit confidential
information to a client.21' Although the Committee did not resolve the issue, it
207. See D.C. B. Ass'n, Op. 281 (1998).
208. See id.
209. Vt. B. Ass'n, Op. 97-5 (1997).
210. Alaska B. Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 98-2 (1998).
211. Pa. B. Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Op. 97-130
(1997).
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1994).
213. Ass'n of the B. of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Prof I and Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 1994-11 (1994).
214. See Mass. B. Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 94-5 (1994); N.H. B. Ass'n, Advisory
Op. 1991-902/6 (1992).
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foundthat communications transmitted over cellular telephones maybeless secure
than communications transmitted over "land-line" telephones. 2' 6 Therefore,
attorneys should be careful not to reveal highly sensitive information over cellular
telephones.
4. Interception of E-mail and Cellular Telephones
E-mail and cellular telephone conversations illegally intercepted do not lose
their privileged status." Under ECPA, privileged communications, including
electronic communications, retain their privileged character in the event they are
intercepted in violation of the law.18 Many states, such as New York, have
followed the federal government's lead and enacted state legislation to protect the
privileged character of communications sent via e-mail."
216. See id.
217. Employee communications may be monitored under the "business related"
exceptions to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-20 (amended bythe Electronic Communications PfivacyAct of 1986,18 U.S.C. §§
2510-22 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)), and are, therefore, subject to disclosure. However,
courts uniformly have found that employers may not surreptitiously monitor their
employees' personal communications. See Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp. ofAthens, Inc., 802
F.2d 412, 417 (11th Cir. 1986) (employee telephone calls that included disparaging
comments about their supervisors and were placed from company telephones during
working hours were "business related" because the employer has legal interest in the
content of telephone calls with the "potential [of] contaminat[ing] the work
environment"); Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414,415-16 (5th Cir. 1980) (an
employer's monitoring of an employee's telephone conversations via an extension
telephone located in another office was in the "ordinary course of business," where the
employer "highly suspected" that the employee was disclosing confidential information
to a competitor); Ariasv. Mut Cent Alarm Servs., Inc., 182 F.R.D. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(twenty-four-hour recording of all calls to and from a security company were found to be
"business related" because such companies are "repositories of extremely sensitive
security information, including informationthat could facilitate access to theircustomers'
premises" by criminals, as well as police and fire departments); Tiberino v. Spokane
County, 13 P.3d 1104, 1108-09 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (while the number of a public
employee's personal e-mails was discoverable, the content of personal e-mails was not
subject to disclosure). But see Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583 (11th
Cir. 1983) (an employer's monitoring of an employee's personaltelephone calls underits
policy as part of its telephone sales training program violated the ECPA where the
employer failed to show compelling business need).
218. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
219. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
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5. Intemet and Intranet Use
Generally, computer electronic communications networks fall into one of two
categories-Internet systems and Intranet systems. A basic understanding of the
differences between the two is germane to understanding the legal responsibilities
placed upon employers regarding the management of its communications.2
An Intranet is a network that, although based on Internet protocols, is
privately owned by a company and is self-contained, accessible solely by the
company's employees or others with authorization."' Today, nearly ninety
percent of all companies use Intranets.' Unlike Internet systems that utilize
public telephone lines, Intranet users are directly connected, and the messages are
not transmitted over public telephone lines.2" While an Intranet's web site and
e-mail system appear and function in the same manner as they would on the
Internet, a closed Intranet network maintains a barrier or "firewalr' that prevents
unauthorized access 24  Firewalls are systems, implemented through both
computer hardware and software, designed to prevent unauthorized access from
the Internet into the private network.' All messages entering or leaving the
Intranet must pass through the firewall, which enables the messages to be
examined and blocked if they fail to meet specific security criteria.2 6 The use of
a firewall is essential for employer Intranet systems because such use likely will
be viewed by courts as a reasonable precaution taken by an employer to maintain
its expectation of privacy, and, therefore, to retain the protections afforded by the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.
Although an Intranet can be operated as a closed network, most companies
link their private Intranets to the public Internet.22 Ordinarily, companies
facilitate that connection through an agreement with an Internet service provider
("ISP"), under which the company's employees access the Internet through
220. For a more in-depth description of the history of the Internet and modes of
access, see, for exampleAmerican CivilLiberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,830-
40 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
221. Jared D. Beeson, Cyberprivacy on the Corporate Intranet: Does the Law
Allow Private-SectorEmployers to Read Their Employees'E-mail?, 20 U. HAw. L. REV.
165, 170 (1998).
222. Caitlin Garvey, Comment, The New Corporate Dilemma: Avoiding Liability
in the Age of Internet Technology, 25 U. DAYToNL. REv. 133, 136 (1999).
223. Beeson, supra note 221, at 170.
224. Webopedia,Intranet, athttp:/Avww.webopedia.com/termlilintranet.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2001).
225. Webopedia, Firewall, athttp:/Avww.webopedia.comltermlf/firewall.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2001).
226. Id.
227. Garvey, supra note 222, at 136.
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telephone lines for which the company pays a fee.' Generally, ISPs operate
Internet servers and also provide services such as e-mail, web-page hosting, or
usernet newsgroups.' Currently, under relevant statutory law, what constitutes
an ISP remains unclear. ° For instance, under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, "service provider" is defined as "an entity offering the transmission, routing,
or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among
points specifiedby a user, of material ofthe user's choosing, withoutmodification
to the content of the material as sent or received."' In general, the ISP label
includes all organizations that provide Internet-related services. The more
companies that link their private Intranets to the Internet, the more they meet the
functional definition of an ISP with the attendant immunity from liability. Thus,
companies with direct links to the Internet appear to meet the functional definition
of an ISP.
V. CONCLUSION
While the business and legal communities have welcomed the freedom and
rapid accessibility ofinformation that modem technology has made possible with
open arms, today's new communications technologies have created pitfalls, and
have and will continue to raise liability issues that must be carefully considered
by employers and their counsel in day-to-day communications, litigation, and
employee relations for years to come. Most, if not all, ofthe pitfalls certainly can
be avoided by careful legal document handling, clear and consistent employee
monitoring, and carefully drafted employee use policies.
228. Garvey, supra note 222, at 140.
229. Garvey, supra note 222, at 137. These providers, however, are occassionailly
distinguished fromtelecommunications providers such as AT&T andUUNET, which are
more commonly known as "Internet Backbone Providers."
230. Garvey, supra note 222, at 138-39.
231. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
232. Garvey, supra note 222, at 137.
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